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 A B S T R A C T  
The purpose of this study is to test empirically the relationship between ownership 
concentration and risk taking by banks which are proxied by the CAR and LDR (li-
quidity ratio). The study was motivated by the limited previous studies that analyze 
the structure of ownership in financial institutions and the weaknesses in sampling. 
Our analysis focused on Indonesia because this country has implemented the Basel 
Accord II standards successfully. This regulatory compliance is expected can control 
banking risk. Using data from 2009 until 2013 and panel data. We found that the 
ownership concentration become important determinants of bank liquidity. These 
findings are expected to provide policy guidance for regulators, especially relating to 
the ownership structure of the bank. However, the ownership concentration proved to 
be involved in the management decision to risk taking in banks.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji secara empiris hubungan antara konsentrasi 
kepemilikan dan pengambilan risiko oleh bank yang diproksikan dengan CAR dan 
LDR (rasio likuiditas). Pada dasarnya, penelitian ini dimotivasi oleh penelitian sebe-
lumnya khususnya penelitian yang menganalisis struktur kepemilikan di lembaga 
keuangan dan kelemahannya dalam sampling. Analisisnya berfokus pada Indonesia 
karena negara ini telah berhasil menerapkan Basel Accord II. Kepatuhan terhadap 
peraturan ini diharapkan dapat mengendalikan risiko perbankan. Adapun, penelitian 
ini menggunakan data dari 2009 sampai 2013 dan panel data. Hasil analisisnya, di-
temukan, bahwa konsentrasi kepemilikan menjadi penentu penting likuiditas pada 
suatu bank. Temuan ini diharapkan dapat memberikan panduan kebijakan untuk 
regulator, terutama yang berkaitan dengan struktur kepemilikan bank. Namun, kon-
sentrasi kepemilikan terbukti terlibat dalam keputusan manajemen untuk mengambil 
risiko di bank.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most studies related to the ownership structure and 
the company’s performance, especially in times of 
crisis, such as Shiefer and Vishny (1997) and La 
Porta et al. (1999), proved that the ownership struc-
ture has significant effect in creating value and the 
company’s performance. Further studies conducted 
after the Asian crisis period by some researchers 
such Firth et al. (2008), investigated the relationship 
between ownership and governance mechanisms 
and agency costs. For another example, Ge W, 
Jeong-Bon Kim, Byron Y. Song (2012) proved the 
internal governance has improved credit quality; 
and so did Conelly, Limpaphayom, and Nagarajan 
(2012). They examined the relationship between the 
quality of corporate governance practices and the 
Thai companies’ value that has a complex owner-
ship structure. 
However, not many studies on the same fields 
had determined the level of risk taking, especially 
in banking industries. For example, Chalermchatvi-
chien et al. (2014) proved that concentrated owner-
ship is a determinant of capital adequacy ratio 
(Capital Adequacy Ratio) and liquidity of banks. In 
addition, the possible effects of Basel III can also 
create the costs, benefits, and the consequence is 
that this needs to be discussed again and again. 
This study attempts to verify whether the con-
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centration of ownership has an effect on the risk of 
the bank or not. Risk is proxied by the ratio of bank 
capital adequacy or capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
and loans to third parties or loans to deposit ratio 
(in this study, it is termed as DPK). 
Previous researchers examined the relationship 
between ownership structure using company data 
and risk taking in the countries in East Asia. In this 
case, their studies have still some limitations in 
terms of determining the sample companies. For 
example, Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) used the 
criteria of the 10 companies with the largest asset in 
analyzing the relationship between the concentra-
tion of ownership and bank risk-taking. 
In contrast to research Chalermchatvichien et 
al. (2014), another study used 68 banks from 11 
countries in East Asia. Yet, the present study has 
something different. First, this study chose the 
banks in Indonesia as an object of study. Indonesia, 
especially this is categorized as a developing coun-
try in which they still have high capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) that is at 18% (June 2013) and well 
above the minimum requirement of 8% (regulatory 
Basel II). Besides that, the ratio of non-performing 
loans (NPL) is still low, 1.9% (Bank Indonesia 2013). 
Banks in Indonesia also have one of the best 
records in Asian countries in implementing Basel II, 
both in terms of the standard implementation and 
the level of regulatory convergence. 
Second, the previous studies used the initial 
observation period of global crisis (2005-2009), 
while the study was conducted from the beginning 
of the crisis, especially after the implementation of 
Basel II. The use of data since the introduction of 
Basel II (after 2008) is intended to look at the impact 
of the post-crisis and the implementation of Basel 
II. It is also intended to see a direct relationship 
between the dependent variable (the capital ade-
quacy ratio and the ratio of bank liquidity). The test 
is also done on the grounds that due to an Indone-
sian companies as listed in the stock market which 
have a unique ownership structure. Therefore, it 
must be more attractive to examine the role of the 
ownership structure of the behavior of managers in 
taking risk in banking institutions. 
It is expected that this study contributes to the 
literature in some areas. First, it can contribute to 
the literature by examining the banking capital re-
quirements in accordance with Basel Accord and 
bank governance. The second section discusses the 
review of literature and the development of hypo-
theses. The third section presents information about 
the selection of samples and data, followed by em-
pirical results, and the last part is the conclusion. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Corporate Governance and Ownership Concentra-
tion 
Corporate Governance (CG) is a concept associated 
with monitoring the management in the process of 
making good decisions. According to La Porta et. 
al. (2000), CG has monitor the mechanism that aims 
to protect investor assets from exploitation by in-
siders. In addition, Shleiver and Vishny (1997), ar-
gue that CG is a set of mechanisms that can protect 
the minority party (outside investors or minority 
shareholders) of a takeover by managers and con-
trol the shareholders (insider) with an emphasis on 
legal mechanisms. 
With the companies whose ownership is con-
centrated, there are two groups of shareholders. 
They are the majority and minority shareholders. 
Agency problem will arise if the companies listed 
on the stock exchange are one of the business units 
of a particular group. This happens if the majority 
shareholder may collude with management to take 
over the assets of the company at the expense of 
minority shareholders. 
However, the agency problem between man-
agers and the majority shareholder will not be so 
serious if the management is appointed by the con-
trolling shareholder. For this case, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) states that concentrated ownership 
can minimize agency problems arising from the 
separation between ownership and control func-
tions. 
Based on the agency's perspective, there are 
two arguments, namely convergence argument and 
the entrenchment argument. For the former, share-
holders may control the manager to make decisions 
appropriate to their interests by taking a lower risk. 
For latter, the y argue that more shareholders who 
act on behalf of depositors will have greater power 
to control manager. On the contrary, the smaller 
shareholdings will be weaker in controlling man-
agers to take risks. In the end, a more concentrated 
ownership has strong control that can suppress 
agency conflict (shareholder with management). 
The research results support the convergence 
argument, such as of research Demsetz et al. (1985) 
and Shleifer & Vishny (1997). Their results can be 
concluded that the control by concentrated owner-
ship is an attempt to reduce risk. 
Based on the entrenchment argument, it can be 
explained that more concentrated ownership could 
harm minority shareholders or depositors. Howev-
er, Demsetz et al. (1985) considers that the share-
holders will act on both arguments depending on 
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their risk-taking incentives. 
In the perspective of the structure of owner-
ship in Indonesian banks, most banks are owned by 
families and individuals or groups. Thus, this can 
increase the concentration of ownership. Business 
decisions on these types of companies are more 
determined by a small number of owners of the 
bank, but are able to control the management in 
taking risks. This structure is supported by the pol-
icy even sole proprietorship (sole proprietorship) or 
single presence policy (Bank Indonesia 2006). Such 
structures can potentially do the moral hazard that 
is taking a higher risk. 
 
Risk and Risk Management 
Risk and banks are two things that cannot be sepa-
rated, because the banking business continues to 
deal with various forms of risk. If the bank cannot 
manage risk properly, it can result in failure and 
bankruptcy of the bank. Bank Indonesia, the defini-
tion of risk is the potential loss due to the occur-
rence of certain events. 
In reference to Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 
5/8 / PBI / 2003 and its revision No. 11/25 / PBI / 
2009 concerning Application of Risk Management 
for Commercial Bank, there are 8 risks that must be 
managed banks, namely: credit risk, market risk, 
risk operational, liquidity risk, compliance risk, 
legal risk, reputation risk and strategic risk. In this 
paper will be devoted to analyzing the implementa-
tion of risk management that has been agreed in the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervisors (BCBS). 
Basel (BIS) issued guidance regarding the calcula-
tion of the capital adequacy ratio (Capital Adequa-
cy Ratio), which includes the management of credit 
risk management, market, and operational. 
This study also examines the liquidity risk that 
occurs when the Bank is not able to provide liquidi-
ty. This risk can be affected by the funding struc-
ture, asset liquidity, liabilities to the counterparty, 
and credit commitments to borrowers. Bank liquid-
ity risk is measured by several indicators, such as 
primary reserve ratio (Statutory minimum and 
Cash), secondary reserve (liquidity reserves), and 
the ratio of loans with deposits (Loan Deposit Ra-
tio). We use LDR as a proxy for liquidity risk in this 
study. 
 
Basel II and its Implementation in Indonesia 
Central bankers and leaders of the G-10 in 1974 
established the Basel Committee for Banking Su-
pervisors (BCBS). This BCBS is intended to close 
the gap between banking regulations in the coun-
tries of the world and is not intended to be the 
world banking authority. 
The secretary of BCBS is located in Basel, Swit-
zerland. In July 1988, the BCBS set up the capital 
adequacy accord (BCA I). BCA-I is a standard me-
thodology for calculating the amount of risk-based 
capital owned by the bank. Determination of the 
minimum capital amount is determined by calcu-
lating the ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
amounted to 8% of risk weighted assets 
(www.bi.go.id). 
Later on, in July 2004, the Basel II established 
minimum capital that was more complex than Ba-
sel I, which only covered credit risk. Yet, BCA II 
includes credit risk, market risk, and operational 
risk, with capital adequacy ratio (CAR) remained 
8%. Subsequently, in January 2013 BCA III frame-
work implemented gradually until full implemen-
tation in January 2019 with the CAR to 10.5% 
The focus of Basel II in Indonesia is the devel-
opment and improvement of the quality of risk 
management by national banks in accordance with 
Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No. 5/8 / PBI / 
2003 dated May 19, 2003 on Risk Management for 
Commercial Banks. The implementation of Basel II 
is expected to reduce the negative impact on com-
petition between banks. This is due to differences in 
the ability and readiness of banks in implementing 
and developing risk management and infrastruc-
ture. 
 
Previous Research and Development Hypothesis 
One of the purposes of regulatory capital is to re-
duce risk taking incentives by the owners by forc-
ing owners to better put their personal wealth in 
the bank (Kim and Santomero 1994). Based on the 
theory of corporate governance that affect the own-
ership structure of risk-taking by the owner (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
proved that the shareholders with voting rights and 
greater cash flow rights have the power and incen-
tive to affect the behavior of corporate managers 
than minority shareholders. 
Further research focuses on the relationship be-
tween ownership and governance structure of 
companies in East Asia conducted by several re-
searchers. For example, La Porta et. al. (2000) and 
Clessens et al. (2000), proves that the East Asian 
companies have concentrated ownership structures 
that tend to control the company effectively. Bel-
tratti research results and Stulz (2011) support that 
concentrated ownership would reduce leverage, 
thus reducing the risk of the bank. In this perspec-
tive, the concentration of ownership drives corpo-
rate performance to be better. In contrast to the 
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perspective proposed by Chalermchatvichien et al 
(2014), it was found that the banks in East Asia with 
a more concentrated ownership structures tend to 
take more risks. Following perspective by Cha-
lermchatvichien et al. (2014), in this study will be 
tested how the ownership structure affects the be-
havior of individuals to risk taking by Indonesian 
banks. 
It is still consistent with Basel II, the present re-
search uses CAR and LDR as a proxy for the bank's 
risk compared to proxy of other risks such as beta 
(see Dolde and Knopf 2006), Non Performing Loan 
(NPL), or Z-score (see Iannota et al. 2007; Shehzad 
et al. 2010). According to Basel II, the banks are 
required to maintain the CAR higher if they have a 
risky asset (indicated by the high LDR). Thus, the 
banks are said to have a high risk if their CAR is 
low (below the minimum limit the provisions of 
Basel II) and has a high LDR (outside the limits of 
the provisions of Basel II). 
It is predicted that that the concentration of 
ownership in Indonesian banks has a positive cor-
relation with risk taking. This means that the 
higher the level of concentration of the bank, the 
more the level of bank risk-taking. This prediction 
is based on the argument by some proponents; 
first, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and 
second, Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) found 
that banks with greater ownership concentration 
influences the behavior of managers to take risks 
higher than the concentration of ownership is 
lower. When a shareholder has significant 
strength (concentrated), there is a tendency that 
the actions of managers to avoid the risk will be 
limited by the shareholders. 
Second, it deals with the weak law enforce-
ment in Indonesia, especially in the capital markets 
that can result in increasing moral hazard by con-
trolling shareholders rather than exercise control to 
reduce risk (Taswan 2009 in Taswan 2012). 
Based on the above arguments, the research 
hypotheses use CAR as a proxy for risk as the fol-
lowing. 
H1a: the concentration of ownership has a negative 
effect on the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
The above hypothesis can describe that the re-
lationship between concentration of ownership and 
the CAR is negative. This means the concentrated 
ownership of the bank will lower the value of CAR. 
CAR Low indicates a lack of ability of banks to un-
derwrite credit or productive assets at risk. In addi-
tion, the bank has a poor ability to fund operations 
and contribute significantly to the profitability of 
banks. (www.bi.go.id). 
The next hypothesis related to the Loan to De-
posit Ratio as a proxy for risk. LDR value is high 
(exceeding 92%) indicating a high risk of banks to 
meet short-term liabilities (liquidity). To cover 
loans to third parties, banks typically create policies 
using resource assets. Consequently, this policy 
may be harder for the banks to meet CAR mini-
mum. Therefore, the relationship between owner-
ship concentration and the LDR is expected to have 
an inverse relationship with the relationship be-
tween concentration of ownership and the CAR. 
The hypothesis can be stated that the relationship 
of ownership concentration and the LDR as a proxy 
for risk is as follows. 
H1b: concentration of ownership has a positive 
effect on loans to deposits ratio (LDR) 
Furthermore, this study re-examines the mod-
els used by Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) that 
use several variables of the companies’ characteris-
tics as control variables, namely: size, leverage, 
market performance, and revenue growth of banks. 
First, it is the size of the company (SIZE). 
Ahmed et al. (2008) proves that size does not affect 
the Bank's CAR. Their research was supported by 
the findings of Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) that 
the measure does not affect the Bank's CAR but 
negatively affect the LDR and Stability Net Fund-
ing Ratio (NSFR). Thus, the nature of the relation-
ship between the size of banks and the risk is ambi-
guous. The size of the larger banks will have more 
ability to diversify risk, but if they are not able to 
efficiently manage their assets would pose a risk in 
line with the increase in assets. 
Second, leverage (LEV) is the ratio of debt di-
vided by equity. Debt to equity ratio (DER) is used 
to measure the level of risk inherent in the structure 
of the debt. DER high shows that the claims of oth-
er parties (creditors) are relatively larger than the 
equity or assets, which can result in non-fulfillment 
of all liabilities (non-full cover) at the time of liqui-
dation. 
Third, Tobin's Q (Tobin) is a measure of mar-
ket performance as measured by the ratio of market 
value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of the asset. The greater 
value of Tobin's Q indicates that the company's 
prospect is better. This can affect the bank's risk 
and encourage them to lower the capital (CAR). In 
addition, the bank may also be increasing loans to 
third parties (LDR). 
Fourth, it deals with the bank's annual revenue 
growth (GROWTH). High revenue growth is ex-
pected to reduce the risks faced by banks to main-
tain the economic stability of the banking system. 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 18, No. 1, August – November 2015, pages 189 – 200 
193 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Selection of Data 
To get representative data, the sample selection was 
done by means of purposive sampling method with 
the following criteria: (1) all commercial banks are 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), and 
(2) Bank publishes Financial Statements for 2008-
2013. This study uses the data from the year 2008 
due to the Basel II implemented on January 1, 2008 
as stipulated by Bank Indonesia. The financial data 
is taken from the data stream, www.idx.co.id, 
www.bi.go.id, and the website of the bank con-
cerned. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Variables consist of the dependent variables, inde-
pendent variables, and control variables. The de-
pendent variables are the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) and the loan to deposits ratio (LDR). Inde-
pendent variable is the concentration of ownership, 
the control variables include firm size, leverage, 
Tobin 's Q, revenue growth, and dummy years. 
 
Dependent Variables: CAR and LDR 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
Bank risk-taking is determined through the CAR 
and LDR. Both of these variables are used because 
in accordance with the provisions or primary focus 
of Basel II emphasizes banks to maintain a capital 
adequacy and liquidity. 
Basel II requires banks to maintain the CAR as 
a buffer in the face of investment in risky assets. 
CAR is the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) is guided by Bank Indonesia regulations 
related to the Minimum Capital Fulfillment of Ob-
ligations (CAR). Here is a formula that shows how 
to calculate a bank's CAR.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  (𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑠  𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑅)
  (1) 
From the formula above, it can be justified that 
CAR or the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
affects the amount of capital and risk-weighted 
assets owned by the bank. If the result of the calcu-
lation shows that the capital adequacy ratio below 
the minimum level set by Bank Indonesia and Basel 
II (8% (Basel II), then the bank will be more cau-
tious in giving credit, so it will affect the potential 
for bank profits earned from loans. 
 
Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) 
As referred to Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No. 
6/23 / DPNP dated May 31, 2004 Appendix 1e, 
LDR can be measured from the total amount of 
loans granted shared with third party funds. The 
loan amount is to determine the bank profits. If the 
bank can lend while funds collected, they will lead 
to losses for banks. Bank Indonesia set a standard 
LDR value between 78% -92%. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠  / 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠  𝑡𝑜  𝑎  𝑇𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦  + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 (2) 
Based on the measurements and explanations 
above, LDR is a ratio used to determine the level of 
bank liquidity and also measuring devices for 
banking intermediation. LDR can also be used to 
assess the bank's management strategy that the 
bank's conservative management tends to have 
relatively low LDR; whereas aggressive bank man-
agement has a high LDR or exceeding the tolerance 
limit. 
 
Independent Variables: Ownership Concentration 
(OC) 
The ownership structure reflects the distribution of 
power and influence among the shareholders on 
the company's operations. One of the characteristics 
of the ownership structure is measured as the per-
centage of ownership of largest shareholders. This 
measure is also used by some previous studies, 
among others, Laeven and Levine (2009) and Cha-
lermchatvichien et al. (2014). They use the size of 
the cash flow rights of the largest shareholders ap-
proximately 10% and 20% of the total shares. 
OC = Percentage of the Reviews Largest Owner (3) 
 
Control Variable  
Control variables are variables controlled or held 
constant so that the relationship of independent 
variables on the dependent variable is not influ-
enced by factors that are not extensively studied. 
When referring to the research by Leaven and 
Levine (2009), this study examined the characteris-
tics of the bank, which may affect the bank's CAR 
and LDR. Terebut control variable is the size of the 
company (SIZE), leverage (LEV), the market per-
formance (Tobin's Q), and the revenue growth 
(GROWTH). 
1. The size of the company (SIZE) 
The company size (SIZE) is a scale to classify the 
size of the company. The variables measured by the 
natural logarithm of the total assets of banks 
2. Leverage (LEV) 
It is the bank leverage, measured by the It ratio of 
debt divided by equity. The higher ratio indicates a 
greater risk to be faced by banks and a lower pro-
portion of the equity or assets. Meanwhile, lower 
ratios decrease the performance of the bank in the 
future. 
3. Market performance (Tobin's Q) 
It is a measure of market performance, measured 
by the ratio of market value of equity plus the book 
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value of liabilities divided by the book value of the 
asset. Klapper and Love (2002) explains that Tobin's 
Q has the advantage over the market return as a 
measure of performance. This is because Tobin's Q 
shows the economic volatility that occurred in de-
veloping countries and as a measure of evaluation 
of the implementation of Good Corporate Gover-
nance. The greater the value of Tobin's Q (or better 
prospects for the company), the lower the risk of 
bank. 
4. Revenue growth (GROWTH) 
Bank earnings performance is measured by growth 
in bank earnings for the fiscal year i t. High revenue 
growth will reduce the risk faced by the bank to 
maintain economic stability and the banking sys-
tem. 
Regression model to explain the relationship 
between concentration of ownership and risk tak-
ing behavior Bank is as follows: 
Bank Riskiit = β0 + β1OCIit + Dummy Yearst + ε  (4) 
Bank Riskiit = β0 + β1OCit + β2SIZEit + β3Levit + 
β4Tobinit + β5 GROWTHit + Dummy Yearst + ε  (5) 
 
Where: 
Bank Riskit: in this case, it uses two alternative 
measures, the CAR and LDR. CAR is measured by 
capital divided by risk-weighted assets of the com-
pany for the fiscal year i t, and LDR is measured 
from loans divided by total deposits of the compa-
ny for the fiscal year i t. 
OCit is the ownership concentration of the bank for 
the fiscal year i t. 
SIZEit is the size of the bank for the fiscal year i t. 
Levit is leveraged bank i for the fiscal year t. 
Tobinit is the bank's market performance for the 
fiscal year i t. 
GROWTHit is the performance of the bank's reve-
nue for the fiscal year i t. 
Dummy Year is to account for possible variations 
over time, with 2008 as the base year. 
ε is the error. 
The data were processed to test the assumption 
by means of classical regression model that is built 
for BLUE (Best, Linear, Unbiased, and Efficient 
Estimator) that include autocorrelation test, multi-
collinearity, heterocedascity. The study also 
presents the descriptive statistics and Goodness of 
Fit Test, partial test (t-test), simultaneous test of 
significance (F test). Furthermore, the test was done 
using the Common Pooled Least Square or Ordi-
nary Least Square (OLS). 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Analysis of Descriptive Statistics 
The population consists of 36 banks listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2009-2013. Table 1 
shows the final 27 samples with a total of 152 ob-
servations. 
Table 2 describes the average and median of 
ownership concentration ownership (OC) is 0.57, 
which is higher than the findings by Chalermchat-
vichien et al. (2014); and Leaven & Levine (2009). 
Table 1 
Population and Sample 
Criteria of Sample Total 
All banks listed in ISE 32 
Reduced from the banks which are not listed in ISE since 2008  (4) 
Reduced from the banks which are listed but not active (during observation period)  (1) 
Total sample 27 
Total observation= 27 bank x 6 period of observation (2008-2013) 162 
Reduced from : incomplete data and not active (10) 
Total of last sample 152 
Source: Data streams, IDX, Bank Indonesia and the concerned bank website. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 CAR LDR OC SIZE (000) LEV TOBIN GROWTH 
 Mean  0.164  0.782  0.567  98.153  0.602  1.078  0.193 
 Med  0.150  0.810  0.570  27.035  0.500  1.030  0.165 
 Max  0.460  1.130  0.990  733.099  2.565  1.658  1.889 
 Minim  0.080  0.400  0.150  1.357  0.002  0.875 -0.225 
 Std. Dev.  0.057  0.136  0.207  149.582  0.459  0.129  0.255 
 Obs  152  152  152  152  152  152  152 
Source: The output of e-Views. 
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That is, the ownership of banks in Indonesia is 
more concentrated than the average ownership of 
banks in East Asia. This evidence is consistent with 
research La Porta et al. (2000) who found that the 
level of concentration of companies in Indonesia 
average of 58%. A high level of concentration is one 
of them caused by weak law enforcement. 
The average CAR is 0.16 (median 0.15) and the 
average LDR was 0.78 (median 0.81) higher than 
the findings by Chalermchatvichien (2014). This 
suggests that banks in Indonesia hold CAR that is 
quite high (16%) compared to those in East Asia 
(14%). Next is the bank's management that appears 
to have a less aggressive strategy (LDR, wich is 
under the provisions of Bank Indonesia (78% -92 
%). 
The total value of assets used to measure the 
size of the company showed an average (median) 
was 98 billion (27 billion). DER values have an av-
erage (median) of 0.6 (0.5) that means that the aver-
age (median) number of bank loans is 60% (50%) 
with a value of 40% equity (50%). Market perfor-
mance as measured by Tobin's Q show that the 
average bank in Indonesia has a value greater than 
1 (1.07). This indicates that most of the banks listed 
on the Stock Exchange has been able to generate 
profits with returns greater than the cost of the as-
set. Revenue growth of banks in Indonesia has an 
average (median) approaching 20%. 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the 
variables where the OC is not significantly and 
negatively correlated with the CAR. This suggests 
that the more concentrated ownership will not 
encourage greater or smaller capitalization. 
Meanwhile, OC positively and significantly is as-
sociated with LDR. That is, the higher the owner-
ship concentration the greater the capital than the 
given third-party funds. From this evidence, it can 
also be seen that the coefficient between indepen-
dent variables is low (under rule of thumb 0.7); 
this means that there is no multicollinearity in the 
regression model. 
 
Analysis of Multivariate Results 
Table 4 provides us with evidence that CAR or 
LDR as the dependent variable shows two models. 
Model 1 and 2 are used to examine the direct rela-
tionship between ownership structure and bank 
risk. The first model is the base model, the second 
model to test H1a and H1b. 
On the panel A, H1a cannot be verified be-
cause of the concentration of ownership has a nega-
tive but significant coefficient for all models. This 
suggests that concentrated ownership is a variable 
that cannot explain the increased risk (by proxy 
CAR). The findings are not consistent with the pre-
dictions and does not support research Chalerm-
chatvichien et al. (2014). 
The above is due to the ownership concentra-
tion which does not have significant effect on CAR 
that is a factor of the high level of CAR. Bank as a 
company is highly regulated by the regulator 
(Bank Indonesia or the Financial Services Authori-
ty). This regulation requires them to meet the min-
imum CAR of 8% (based on Basel II). The average 
CAR of banks in Indonesia is 16% that already 
meet this provision. This reflects the high level of 
CAR risks faced by banks is low and shows that 
good governance mechanisms (Konishi and Yasu-
da 2004). Thus, concentrated ownership of the 
Table 3 
Correlation Analysis 
Corr t-Stat CAR LDR OC SIZE LEV TOBIN  
CAR  1.000       
 -----        
LDR  -0.201 1.000      
 (-2.511) -----       
OC  -0.106 0.181 1.000     
 (-1.313) (2.259) -----      
SIZE  -0.145 -0.058 0.069 1.000    
 (-1.801) (-0.722) (0.852) -----     
LEV  -0.084 -0.127 -0.181 -0.097 1.000   
 (-1.033) (1.579) (-2.259) (-1.201) -----    
TOBIN  0.050 0.042 0.023 0.316 -0.264 1.000  
 (0.617) (0.523) (0.287) (4.084) (-3.353) -----   
REV  0.156 0.023 -0.139 -0.122 -0.032 -0.102 1.000 
 (1.936) (0.291) -1.726 (-1.507) (-0.401) (-1262) -----  
Source: The e-Views output. 
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predicted positive effect on the bank's risk in the 
study was not proven. 
Some evidences deal with the regression influ-
ence of the control variable are the size of the com-
pany (SIZE) and borrowing (leverage) and signifi-
cantly negatively is associated with the CAR, while 
the market performance (Tobin's Q) positively and 
significantly is associated with CAR. Revenue 
growth (GROWTH) does not have significant coef-
ficients. It can be concluded that according to pre-
dictions by the increasing size of the company, high 
leverage, and the poorer market performance will 
increase the risks faced by the bank indicated by 
the low value of the CAR. 
Unlike the panel A, panel B uses LDR as the 
dependent variable. It shows a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient as the basic model by includ-
ing control variables. This significant and posi-
tive correlation means that the more ownership 
concentration of the banks, the more credit is 
given to third parties. So, this result is still con-
sistent with predictions. This is also consistent 
with the view that owners tend to take risks ra-
ther than managers and creditors (Galai and Ma-
sulis 1976; Demsetz and Lehn and 1985). For that 
reason, the greater the cash flow, the greater the 
incentive and the power to increase the risk-
taking of banks compared to the small share-
holders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; and John, 
Litov, and Yeung 2008). 
The test result of the control variables for the 
model using LDR as the dependent variable 
Table 4 
Regression Analysis: The Effect of Ownership Concentration 
Panel A – Proxy of Risk: CAR 
Variables Prediction 
CAR (OLS) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant  0.178*** 
(14.53) 
0.291*** 
(6.77) 
OC - -0.024 
(-1.35) 
-0.012 
(-0.68) 
Size ?  -0.007*** 
(-3.84) 
Lev -  -0.024*** 
(-3.99) 
Tobin’ Q +  0.035* 
(1.98) 
Growth +  0.003 
(0.39) 
Year dummies included  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  40.58% 44.10% 
F-statistic  13.20*** 9.97*** 
 
Panel B – Proxi of Risk: LDR 
Variables Prediction 
LDR (OLS) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant  0.706*** 
(20.45) 
0.446*** 
(3.89) 
OC + 0.137*** 
(2.69) 
0.182*** 
(3.16) 
Size ?  0.004 
(0.80) 
Lev +  0.038** 
(2.15) 
Tobin’s Q -  0.132*** 
(2.70) 
Growth -  -0.019 
(-1.09) 
Year dummies   Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  71.41% 72.19% 
F-statistic  45.61*** 30.50*** 
Notes: ***significant at level 1%, **significant at level 5%. 
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shows that borrowing (leverage) and market per-
formance  (Tobin) positively and significantly are 
associated with LDR. On the contrary, the other 
control variables such as firm size (SIZE) and 
earnings growth (GROWTH) do not have signifi-
cant coefficients. In this condition, the bigger size 
of the bank and the higher leverage, the greater 
the risks faced by the bank. This is indicated by 
the high value of the LDR. As for the variable of 
market performance, it is significantly positively 
associated with LDR. This evidence is not consis-
tent with the prediction by the researchers that the 
two variables are negatively related. There is a 
possibility, why the value of the bank can increase 
the risk of the bank. It is due to increasing the val-
ue of the bank that eventually can encourage 
management to aggressively lend to third parties 
(LDR). Thus, when the level of LDR is higher, it 
will increase banks’ liquidity risk. 
In general, almost all the models indicate that 
the use of different risk proxies produce different 
findings. For example, CAR and LDR as proxies 
for bank risk seem to have trade-offs, in accor-
dance with the correlation table that the correla-
tion between the two is negative and significant. 
Thus, in interpreting the results of the study, the 
researchers must be careful, especially in linking 
the findings to the agency theory. Whether the 
results of this study support the convergence ar-
gument or inconsistent with the entrenchment 
argument? As proposed by Demsetz et al. (1997) 
and Sheifer & Vishny (1997). 
Table 5 
 Regression Analysis – the Effect of Ownership Concentration on the Initial Years 
Panel A – Proxy of Risks: CAR 
Variables 
CAR 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.168*** 
(12.51) 
0.302*** 
(6.06) 
OC (early year) -0.004 
(-0.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
Size  -0.008*** 
(-4.24) 
Lev  -0.008*** 
(-4.09) 
Tobin’s Q  0.025 
(1.30) 
Growth  0.013 
(1.03) 
Year dummies included Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 33.05% 41.53% 
F-statistic 9.53*** 8.81*** 
 
Panel B – Proxy of Risks: LDR 
Variables 
LDR 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.7130*** 
(21.54) 
0.4089*** 
(3.35) 
OC (early year) 0.0829* 
(1.73) 
0.1286** 
(2.31) 
Size  0.0026 
(0.44) 
Lev  0.0377** 
(2.22) 
Tobin’s Q  0.1921*** 
(4.12) 
Growth  0.0132 
(0.63) 
Year dummies included Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 76.67% 73.79% 
F-statistic 57.82*** 31.98*** 
Notes: ***significant at level 1%, **significant at level 5%. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
Endogeneity: Reverse Causality 
To investigate the possibility of a causal relation-
ship between the ownership concentration and 
bank risk taking, it uses an endogenous variable. It 
means that the bank's risks determine the owner-
ship structure. The basic consideration is the struc-
ture and characteristics of governance in Asia, par-
ticularly in Indonesia, are the possibility of reverse 
causality that is plausible. 
The ownership structure of banks in Indonesia 
is attached and rarely changes from time to time. 
This is probably caused by the presence of most of 
the major shareholders are members of the found-
ing family or members of industry groups (institu-
tions) who maintain control from the very begin-
ning the bank was established. 
However, the CAR and LDR can fluctuate 
from time to time, especially around the financial 
crisis. If the ownership structure changes due to 
changes in CAR and LDR, the study can observe 
more variation associated with the fluctuation. In 
addition, an additional analysis should be done to 
minimize the possibility of reverse causality, by the 
following: 
(1) Identifying banks with CAR and LDR which 
change from time to time, while the ownership 
concentration has remained constant. That is, 
the ownership concentration can not be affected 
by the CAR and LDR. The result shows that on-
ly about 3% of the sample of banks shows 
changes in higher concentrations when the CAR 
decreased. 
(2) It deals with the possibility that the sample is 
prone to endogeneity and reverse causality. 
Thus, the researchers examined changes in the 
concentration of ownership of any bank in any 
given year to the concentration of ownership in 
the early years of the sample. The logic is that 
the ownership concentration in the early years 
which was not caused by CAR or LDR liquidity 
in subsequent years. If the results of these tests 
found no significant association, it can be con-
cluded this study did not produce the effect of 
changing the direction of causality for LDR, 
CAR, and ownership structure. 
Table 5 shows the results of the regression on 
the impact of ownership concentration when the 
initial public offering (IPO). Panel A uses CAR as 
the dependent variable, while panel B uses LDR as 
the dependent variable. Ownership concentration 
in the early years has the same coefficient with 
coefficient of ownership concentration as shown in 
Table 4 for the second panel. Therefore, reverse 
causality is not possible in this study, and the re-
sults of this study are strong (robust). 
 
The Effect of Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis beginning in late 2008 resulted 
in the economic crisis in most of the world. Mainly, 
it was due to the credit crisis that was skyrocketing 
(boom) until mid-2007, followed by the subprime 
mortgage crisis and some security products. The 
crisis was also raising concerns about the solvency 
and liquidity of banks (Ivashina & Scharfstein 
2009). According to Bank Indonesia (2010) that 
banks as the financial sector cannot be separated 
from the impact of the global financial crisis. For 
example, in October 2008, the three major state-
owned banks such as PT Bank Mandiri Tbk., PT 
Bank BNI Tbk, and PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk 
received liquidity support from the Government of 
each Rp 5 trillion. This study tries to explore if this 
crisis is likely to alter the relationship between 
ownership structure, bank capital (CAR), and li-
quidity (LDR) Bank. 
Table 6 
Additional Analysis: The Effect of Financial Crisis  
Variables 
Model 2 
CAR LDR 
Constant 0.269*** 
(6.39) 
0.480** 
(2.56) 
OC -0.014 
(-0.78) 
0.143* 
(1.89) 
Crisis 0.006 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
OC*Crisis -0.011 
(-0.44) 
-0.046 
(-0.56) 
Control Variable  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 49.90% 44.49% 
F-statistic 16.56*** 13.52*** 
Notes: ***significant at level 1%, **significant at level 5%. 
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The sample was taken during the period 2008-
2013, in which the banking crisis began in late 2008 
and continued until 2009. The year 2009 was the 
first year the bank felt the impact of the financial 
crisis which is classified as a period of crisis by us-
ing a binary variable (dummy): The value for 2009 
and the value zero otherwise. These variables were 
interacted to determine the interactive effects of 
shocks and financial crises. The variable coefficient 
describes the impact of ownership concentration of 
capitalization and liquidity. 
As shown in Table 6, Panel A and Panel B use 
CAR and LDR as the dependent variables. Both 
crisis as an independent variable and the moderat-
ing variable cannot prove ownership concentration 
relationship with CAR and LDR because there is no 
significant coefficients. This shows that the finan-
cial crisis does not change the relationship between 
the ownership concentration and the CAR. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
It can be generalized that the ownership concentra-
tion does not affect the capitalization (CAR). How-
ever, this factor can increase the risk of liquidity 
(LDR). 
In addition, it can also be implied that there is 
a significant effect of the risk of ownership concen-
tration on the bank. This study contributes to bank-
ing practitioners and regulators associated with the 
policy direction of bank ownership, especially the 
ownership concentration. The ownership structure 
is proved to be involved in management decisions 
to take risks. There are some limitations in this 
study. For further research, there are some sugges-
tions due to the limitations. 
First, a proxy for risk is limited to the CAR and 
LDR. For that reason, it is necessary to enter a 
proxy for risk Basel III, namely liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR) and net stable funded ratio (NSFR) to 
determine the impact of the rules of Basel III, as 
adopted in 2013, although the new provision would 
be required for implementation in 2018. 
Second, the independent variable is only the 
ownership concentration and this is inadequate for 
explaining the impact on risk. Therefore, further 
research may add other variables related to owner-
ship structure, such as foreign ownership, govern-
ment ownership, and family ownership. Besides 
the above, it is also necessary to use other measures 
such as the voting right which is not the ultimate 
ownership (La Porta et al. 1999; 2000), or using a 
dummy variable concentration. 
Finally, the study found that ownership con-
centrations affect the banks’ risks. Therefore, it is 
imperative that the regulators make policies that 
restrict ownership concentration to reduce the like-
lihood of negative effects for minority shareholders 
or depositors. 
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